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Abstract Experimental evidence suggests that individual consumption has not only
personal value but also enters the social part of the utility. Existing models of social
preferences make ad hoc parametric assumptions about the nature of this duality. This
creates a problem of experimental identification of preferences since without such
assumptions it is impossible to distinguish whether consumption or social concerns
are driving the behavior. Given observed choice, the Axiomatic model of preferences
in this article makes it possible to unambiguously determine personal and social util-
ity without any assumptions about their relationship. The unique separation can be
achieved only if the individual choices in different subgroups of other people are avail-
able. Preferences over consumption and status are used as an example to demonstrate
how the utility is constructed. The model shows what kind of information about choice
is needed to empirically determine the nature of social preferences without making
restrictive assumptions. This can help to estimate whether personal consumption or
social value is more important in economic decisions.
Keywords Axiomatic systems · Experiments · Social preferences · Status ·
Subjective probability
JEL Classification D01 · D11 · C90
1 Introduction
It is a well-established fact that people have strong tendency to compare themselves
with their social group. Deviations from selfishness due to distributional concerns
were found in many experimental settings: markets (Ball et al. 2001); public goods
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(Andreoni 1995; Fehr and Gächter 2000); Ultimatum games (Güth et al. 1982; Costa-
Gomes and Zauner 2001). One way to rationalize the behavior in these experiments is
to assume that utility is a function of the payoffs of others. This modeling technique
was used in several studies: inequality aversion, reciprocity, and fairness (Fehr and
Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Rabin 1993); altruism and spitefulness
(Levine 1998); status seeking (Frank 1985). The goal of this avenue of research is
to find social utility that explains the behavior in as many settings as possible. The
following principle is generally used. An assumption is made about the nature of
interdependence in preferences, for example, inequality aversion, status seeking, or
altruism; some parametric functional form is proposed and the estimates of its param-
eters are found from the data.
There are several difficulties with this approach. First, the behavior in many exper-
iments can be consistent with different assumptions on the nature of interdependence.
For example, proposing non-zero amount in the Dictator game can be explained by
inequality aversion, altruism, or even status seeking.1 Likewise, the behavior in the
Ultimatum game can be explained by any of the three models. Second, it is impossi-
ble to pin down relative importance of personal and social utility in the environments
where personal and social incentives are aligned. For example, people’s preference for
big cars over small ones can have very different driving force: it can be simply personal
preference; it can be an attempt to “keep up with the Jonses;” or it can be the desire
for less inequality (given that your car is smaller than average). Third, the models
cited above are normally tested in experiments that involve games, thus confounding
the effects of interdependence with intentionality (McCabe et al. 2003) which plays
important role in game theoretic settings (Falk et al. 2008).2
The problems mentioned above make it hard to conclude what is the true nature
of interdependence in preferences and how to determine it unambiguously from the
observed choice. There are many reasons why knowing this is important. Sobel (2009)
and Dufwenberg et al. (2008) show that separable other-regarding preferences are
necessary to achieve market efficiency. Therefore, testing separability hypothesis is
crucial for applicability of theories based on general equilibrium. Another important
factor is the shape of social utility. Suppose that we discovered that people are more
inequality averse than status seeking. In this case, government policies directed at
more equal wealth distribution can increase social welfare. However, if the reverse is
true, such policy can lead to inefficiency as people might allocate resources away from
consumption and toward status competition. If status seeking is prevalent then taxing
consumption might be Pareto improving as it will decrease excessive spending on sta-
tus goods (Layard 1980). This is the case because utility from status does not change
if everyone decreases their status goods consumption, but personal utility increases as
the money once spent on status goods is now spent on personal consumption goods.
Another empirical question is How big is social utility comparing to the personal
one? For example, it is clear that in many environments people spend resources on
1 Cummins (2005) discusses the evidence of high-status individuals proposing “gifts” or “protection” to
low-status ones without expecting anything in return.
2 Players in the extensive form game show intentionality when they try to understand others’ intentions
after some choice has been made. For example, McCabe et al. (2003) show that simple addition of an action
in the beginning of the game that is rarely taken influences the consecutive behavior of the second movers.
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status competitions. If status is relatively unimportant, then policies to reduce overcon-
sumption might not be necessary. If the opposite is true, as argued in classical studies of
Smith (1759) and Veblen (1899), then government can increase welfare by eliminating
the incentives to be involved in status seeking.3 The knowledge of the structure of inter-
dependence in preferences is important in different areas of economic research. For
example, it can suggest better policies for designing incentives inside the firm (Auriol
and Renault 2008); bring better understanding of international economic migration
(Massey et al. 1993); or help explain consumption patterns (Charles et al. 2009).
This article is an attempt to develop a theoretical framework that makes it possi-
ble to uncover social preferences from the observed choices. Within this framework,
it should be also possible to make absolute quantitative comparisons between social
and personal preferences and between preferences revealed in different environments.
I show that if preferences are consistent with certain Axioms, then, in the equiva-
lent utility representation, the shape of social utility as well as its size relative to the
personal utility can be determined unambiguously. In order to achieve this unique
identification, I assume that the choices of the same person are observed in more than
one social group. The difference in preferences between the groups is then used to
determine the utility.
The search for the Axiomatic systems and equivalent representations in this article
is guided by the desire to have simple testable Axioms and tractable utility that can
be used in further research. The proposed Axioms are simple and easy to test and the
utility form that they imply has straightforward meaning with few parameters. The
framework, therefore, suggests experimental designs and points at the requirements
for the empirical data that are necessary for testing the hypotheses about the properties
of social utility. This makes it possible to find out the nature of interdependence with-
out using parametric assumptions on the shape of the utility and without confounding
it with intentionality.
The shape of the utility is limited only by assumptions and Axioms necessary for
unique separability of consumption and social utilities (see Definitions 1 and 3 and
Axioms E1–E5).4 However, I use status seeking to illustrate how the model works.
There are several reasons for this. First, the desire for both status and consumption
drive the behavior in the same direction, thus making it most challenging to separate
their effects. Second, growing body of literature supports the hypothesis that envy and
the resulting desire for status are evolved traits of humans beings (Cummins 2005).
Economic experiments also confirm this (Vostroknutov et al. 2011).
Ok and Koçkesen (2000) study similar model in which the agent has preferences
over her possessions and the distribution of possessions of others (though without
considering different social groups). They describe the Axioms that give rise to the
negatively interdependent preferences that depend only on the possessions of the agent
and the mean of the distribution. The authors overcome the unidentifiability problem
by assuming that personal consumption is linear in the amount of goods and inter-
dependence in preferences is negative (status). In my approach, the possibility of
3 See De Graaf et al. (2005) for a variety of anecdotal examples of overconsumption.




comparison between groups makes it possible to have arbitrary interdependence and
consumption parts of the utility function.
The article is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, I use examples to discuss conceptual
problems with separability of social and personal parts of the preferences. Section 3
describes the basic framework and two approaches to representing the social part of
the preferences. In Sects. 4 and 5, the models with single and multiple distributions
are described. Section 6 contains discussion on why group size might matter for social
preferences. Proofs of the theorems and lemmata can be found in Sects. 7 and 8.
Section 8 contains some additional results.
2 Separability of consumption and status
People choose to buy some goods purely for consumption purposes, for example cheap
food. Other goods are bought for status reasons. However, some goods are chosen for
both reasons at once. A good example is cars. People like cars because they are con-
venient. However, it can hardly be denied that certain cars are produced and bought
for status reasons as well.
In order to model social preferences, it is, thus, important to have consumption
and social parts of the utility intertwined. How should these parts be represented?
The consumption part of the preferences should be independent of anything related
to others. Consider a man stranded on an island alone with a luxurious car. We can
find out the utility Uc(x0) that the man derives from the car since it can still be used to
take him from point A to B.5 This utility is pure consumption utility, independent of
anything related to others since there is no one else on the island. Now suppose that
suddenly a group of tourists arrive together with their cars. If the man is status seeking,
he would compare his car to other cars and prefer his car to be better than as many
of them as possible. Thus, the utility of the car might change to, say, U (x0, μ) where
μ represents the characteristics of all other cars. However, it is still safe to assume
that the man keeps liking his car as a mean of transportation. Therefore, I assume
that U (x0, μ) = Uc(x0)+Us(x0, μ) where Us(x0, μ) represents the social utility that
“appeared” once others have arrived.6
Now, suppose we can only observe the man in the presence of others. We deduce
his utility to be Uc(x0)+ Us(x0, μ). But can we claim that Uc(x0) is the consumption
utility and Us(x0, μ) is the social utility? Here is a problem. Choose any function
g(x0) and redefine the utility as U (x0, μ) = g(x0) + U¯s(x0, μ), where U¯s(x0, μ) =
Us(x0, μ) + Uc(x0) − g(x0). So, now g becomes the utility for consumption! This
shows that it is impossible in principle to separate status or any other social preference
from consumption in a unique way when we observe individual choices that conform
with utility U .
One way around this is to assume that we can observe the choices of the agent inside
different social groups as well as between the groups. Consider another example of
5 x0 represents some characteristics of the car.
6 Similar additive structure is used in Maccheroni et al. (2008). Bell and Keeney (2008) also use additive
utility.
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preferences of a game theorist over the number of publications in top economics
journals and two social groups: “economists” and “biologists.” Assume that, if the
game theorist has any social preferences at all, she cares more about economists than
biologists. This means that there are distributions of possessions of others such that
she is not indifferent to which group to belong (given some fixed number of personal
publications).7
If game theorist reveals that she prefers to have more publications than everybody
else while being among economists and she does not care about the number of her
publications while being among biologists (regardless of their publications in top eco-
nomics journals), then we can conclude that she does not derive any personal utility
from the number of publications, and that her true social preferences are revealed
through the comparisons with other economists. Such relations of preferences inside
different social groups therefore can uncover the shape of social utility.
Another important piece of information about preferences can be elicited from the
choices between groups. Imagine that game theorist reveals that she cares about rela-
tive number of her publications among economists as well as among biologists but to
lesser extent. Also suppose that, when asked to which group she wants to belong, game
theorist is indifferent as long as all economists and biologists do not have any publi-
cations. This means that for the specific distribution of publications of others (nobody
has any) game theorist chooses as if groups do not exist. This information can be used
to reconstruct the personal part of her preferences which is the same across two groups.
The answers to the questions like “Do you prefer to have a or b publications given
that no one else has any?” thus reveal her personal preference for own publications.
After that, social preferences in each group can be found by “subtracting” the unique
personal preferences.8
I show that it is possible to construct utility, unique up to a positive affine trans-
formation, as long as the comparisons like the above can be made. In the example,
preferences can be represented by two functions: U1(x0, μ) = Uc(x0) + Us1(x0, μ)
and U2(x0, μ) = Uc(x0) + Us2(x0, μ) which correspond to the two groups. Notice
that the personal utility Uc is group independent. The pivotal assumptions that are
necessary for this result are (1) preferences are observed inside different groups and
between them; (2) there are distributions of possessions of others such that the agent
cares to which group to belong; (3) there are distributions of possessions of others
such that the agent does not care to which group to belong.
3 The framework
The world consists of agent 0 and a finite set S of other agents with |S| > 1 and
{0} /∈ S. We are interested in modeling the preferences of agent 0. Agent 0 has the
7 In this example, I assume that the game theorist has intrinsic preferences over the number of publications.
Another valid approach is to see the desire to have more publications than others as means to achieving
more personal consumption (Postlewaite 1998).
8 If there are more than two groups, then, as long as the game theorist is indifferent between any two groups
given the same possessions of others (no one has any publications), the same argument can be used to find
social preferences in all groups.
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measure of possessions and social status x0 ∈ X , where X is any non-empty set with
|X | > 2. This measure can be some aggregate that is calculated using the possessions
or some qualities of the agent, depending on the social group of interest. For example,
it can be the money value of all the goods that the agent has (X = R+), or it can be
the possessions themselves (X = Rn+).9 The crucial assumption is that x0 plays dual
role of bringing not only consumption but also social benefit.
Think of S as a “big” set of all people that agent 0 can possibly care about. This
can be, for example, people of the same profession, like all economists, or any other
big social group. It is realistic to assume that at any given time agent 0 does not take
into consideration everybody in S, but only some subset T ⊆ S. This subset can be,
for example, the people that are geographically close to agent 0 (economists on the
same economics department). An intuition behind this assumption might be like this:
everybody in T observes the possessions (social status) of agent 0, because they are
close to him and everybody else in S\T does not directly see agent 0’s possessions
(status); agent 0 does not take into account the people who do not see his possessions,
but can potentially do so if they become aware of them (for example, if agent 0 moves
to different city, or another economics department).
The final assumption that I am making is that agent 0 observes the possessions
(status) of other agents in T . In particular, he sees the distribution of possessions of
others in set X and can express preferences over his x0 ∈ X and distributions over
statuses of others in a given subgroup. In addition, I assume that agent 0 can report to
which of the two groups of others he would like to belong, given proposed levels of
his status and the distributions of possessions of others in both groups.
In principle, it is possible to have the utility representation for the preferences which
are defined only on elements of X without any uncertainty. However, this approach
faces a problem of multiplicity of utility functions (not up to a positive affine transfor-
mation). The assumption that preferences are defined over distributions of possessions
eliminates this problem making utility representation unique (up to a positive affine
transformation).
In the following two sections, I explore two different ways in which agent 0 can see
the distributions of others. One possibility is that for any group T ⊆ S agent 0 regards
the possessions of each individual in T as coming from a single distribution (Sect. 4).
Another possibility is that agent 0 considers separate distribution for each individual
agent in T (Sect. 5). The goal for both cases is to find a simple utility representation
and the set of simple Axioms equivalent to this representation that would allow for an
intuitive way of separating consumption and status preferences.
4 The model with single distribution
Assume that there are two fixed subgroups of others S1 and S2.10 Suppose that agent 0
has information only about distributions of possessions of others in these two groups
and no information about particular individuals inside the groups. From the empirical
9 The set X can be any set. Analogy with reals is brought only for illustration.
10 The axiomatization below can be easily generalized to any number of groups with minor modifications.
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perspective this situation happens, for example, when agent 0 faces a decision to which
neighborhood to move in and he has information about income distributions in each of
them. From the individual or game theoretic perspective, S1 and S2 can be thought of
as two individuals. In this case, agent 0 considers the distributions of their possessions.
Regardless of the interpretation, the important assumption here is that agent 0 thinks
of only one distribution of possessions attached to each group.
The preferences of agent 0 are defined over two separate sets (X2) of simple
lotteries over X2.11 The two copies of (X2) represent agent 0’s possessions and his
possible observations of the possessions of others in groups S1 and S2. For any fixed
group and lottery, the first component of X2 represents the possessions of agent 0. The
conditional distribution of the second component given fixed x0 from the support of
the first component represents agent 0’s possible observation of possessions of all other
agents in S1 or S2. For example, the degenerate lottery (x0, x) ∈ (X2) represents
the situation in which agent 0 has possessions x0 and each agent in, say, S1 has pos-
sessions x . I assume that agent 0 might not know his own possessions with certainty,
but he knows the probabilities of realizations of his possessions and the observations
of the possessions of others, given those realizations. Let us assume that we observe
agent 0’s preferences over all lotteries ES1 = ES2 := (X2) in both groups of others.
Let E := ES1 ∪ ES2 be the set of all possible lotteries over agent 0’s possessions and
possessions of others in both groups and let  be a preference relation over E with ∼
and  being its symmetric and asymmetric parts.
The following notation will be used in this section. Let S = {S1, S2} be a two
element set. For T ∈ S write (x0, η)T ∈ ET as an element of (X2) such that the
possessions of agent 0 are fixed at x0 and the possessions of all other agents in T are
distributed according to η ∈ (X). The expectation of a function with two arguments
is written as Eh[v(x0, x)] for h ∈ (X2), or as Eη[v(x0, ·)] for η ∈ (X), with first
argument fixed.
4.1 Separation of consumption and status
In this section, the minimal number of Axioms is given that allows for the intuitive sep-
aration of consumption from status. The first set of Axioms are the standard conditions
necessary to obtain expected utility representation for the preferences.
E1  is reflexive, transitive, total,12 and non-trivial:
1.1 For all T ∈ S, there are x0 ∈ X and η, ν ∈ (X) such that (x0, η)T 
(x0, ν)T
1.2 There are x∗0 ∈ X and η∗ ∈ (X) such that (x∗0 , η∗)S1  (x∗0 , η∗)S2
E2 Independence. For all T ∈ S, all h, z, w ∈ ET and all α ∈ (0, 1)
h  z ⇒ αh + (1 − α)w  αz + (1 − α)w
11 Set (X2) consists of all distributions ((x0i , xi ) ◦ pi )i=1...N with finite support. Here x0i is the pos-
sessions of agent 0, xi —possessions of others in one of the two groups, and pi —the probability of the
occurrence of the pair (x0i , xi ).
12 Totality: a = b ⇒ [a  b ∨ b  a].
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E3 Continuity. For all T ∈ S, all h, z, w ∈ ET there exist α, β ∈ (0, 1)
h  z  w ⇒ αh + (1 − α)w  z  βh + (1 − β)w
Apart from the standard weak order assumptions, Axioms E1 requires that  is non-
trivial in two different ways: E1.1 asks for agent 0 to care about what others have; E1.2
asks for the existence of a pair (x∗0 , η∗) such that agent 0, given the choice between
two groups, prefers being in group S1 rather than S2 with the same level of his and
others’ possessions. Throughout the exposition, the asymmetry between S1 and S2
will be maintained: agent 0 will be assumed to care more about S1.
Axioms E2 and E3 are standard requirements for  to have expected utility rep-
resentation. Notice that these Axioms restrict  only inside each fixed group and
they say nothing about the choices between groups. When eliciting preferences from
choices between lotteries, it might happen that E2 and/or E3 are violated (e.g., com-
mon ratio effect). However, the meta-analysis of many decision making experiments
(see Starmer (2000) for overview) shows that EU violations become salient only for
choices close to the border of the probability simplex. Thus, eliciting EU preferences
with lotteries in the middle of the simplex should be possible.
The next two Axioms are the minimal conditions that allow for the intuitively sen-
sible way to disentangle consumption part of the preferences from the status part (or
many other types of interdependency).13 The main idea is to fix agent 0’s possessions
x0 ∈ X and the possessions of others η ∈ (X) and see how he chooses between
the two groups. There are two possibilities: (1) agent 0 prefers one group to the other:
(x0, η)S1  (x0, η)S2 ; (2) agent 0 is indifferent: (x0, η)S1 ∼ (x0, η)S2 . In the former
case, since everything but the group identity is fixed, agent 0’s choice must have been
influenced only by the properties of the groups. In the latter case, there are two pos-
sible explanations: agent 0 is indifferent, because he does not care at all to which
group to belong (which is ruled out by E1.2); or he does care about the groups, but
is indifferent in this particular case because of some property of η (for example, as
long as everybody has the same amount as agent 0, he does not care which group
to be with). This last possibility gives us the way to reveal the consumption part of
agent 0’s preferences. Suppose that we somehow established that agent 0 is indiffer-
ent between (x0, η)S1 and (x0, η)S2 because of some property of η and that the same
holds for some (y0, ν)S1 and (y0, ν)S2 . For these two pairs, the effects of differences
between groups are offset by the special properties of η and ν. Therefore, agent 0’s
preferences over (x0, η)S1 and (y0, ν)S1 are influenced only by the consumption ben-
efits of x0 and y0. The following Axioms make sure that comparisons like this can be
made.
E4 Group Indifference.
4.1 For all x0 ∈ X , there is x∗ ∈ X such that (x0, x∗)S1 ∼ (x0, x∗)S2
4.2 For any , m ∈ (X2) and α ∈ [0, 1], it is true that
[S1 ∼ S2 ∧ mS1 ∼ mS2 ] ⇒ (α+(1−α)m)S1 ∼ (α+(1−α)m)S2
13 Certain types of social preferences cannot be represented in this framework. See explanations after
Axiom E4.
123
Preferences over consumption and status 517
Axiom E4.1 requires that for any x0, we can find some level of possessions of
others x∗ ∈ X such that agent 0 is indifferent between the groups. If such element
does not exist for some x0, then we cannot use the procedure described above to sep-
arate the consumption effect. Indeed, suppose that for any η ∈ (X) we have strong
preference between (x0, η)S1 and (x0, η)S2 . Assume that  can be represented by
some utility function. Then, the utilities of (x0, η)S1 and (x0, η)S2 have to depend on
some properties of the groups all the time, thus making it impossible to disentangle
the consumption part (see Sect. 4.2 for the additional discussion). This creates certain
restrictions on the types of social preferences that can be studied in this framework.
For example, if S1 is an in-group and S2 is an out-group and agent 0 has altruistic
preferences for the in-group but not for the out-group, then he will always have pref-
erence (x0, η)S1  (x0, η)S2 for all x0 and η. Here, in-group has special meaning to
agent 0 which makes it impossible to fit into this framework.
E4.2 asks for some consistency when the mixtures of indifferent pairs are consid-
ered. Given two indifferent pairs, the same mixture of them in both groups keeps agent
0 indifferent.
E5 Group Disparity. For all x0 ∈ X and η, ν ∈ (X) with (x0, η)S1 ∼ (x0, η)S2
(x0, ν)S2  (x0, η)S2 ⇒ (x0, ν)S1  (x0, ν)S2 and
(x0, η)S2  (x0, ν)S2 ⇒ (x0, ν)S2  (x0, ν)S1
Axiom E5 establishes the way in which agent 0 can care differently about the two
groups. It says that agent 0 always cares more about S1 than about S2: for any indif-
ferent pair (x0, η)S1 ∼ (x0, η)S2 , if agent 0 prefers some (x0, ν) in S2 to (x0, η) in S2
then he should like it even more in S1 and vice versa. This Axiom (and E5 below)
assumes asymmetry between S1 and S2. The Axiom could have also asked for one of
the two groups to play the role of S1. This can be done by switching the names of the
groups instead.
To illustrate the intuition think of the groups of economists and biologists, an econo-
mist would value his academic success higher if other economists know about it rather
than when biologists know about it and other way round: he would be more unhappy if
other economists get aware of his academic misfortune than when biologists find out
about it. This Axiom essentially establishes the desired property of the indifference
pairs (x0, η)S1 ∼ (x0, η)S2 : the indifference between the groups can result only from
the special properties of η which are group independent (see Sect. 4.2 for the additional
discussion).
Axioms E1–E5 are enough for the desired utility representation (see Theorem 2).
However, the result comes with the conditions on the utility functions that are hard
to verify (conditions (4.3) and (4.4)). Therefore, I first present a little bit less general
result which requires an additional Axiom. In this representation, the utility functions
are well behaved.
E6 Likes and Dislikes. For any T ∈ S, x0 ∈ X and η ∈ (X) with (x0, η)S1 ∼
(x0, η)S2
either ∀ν ∈ (X) (x0, ν)T ∼ (x0, η)T
or ∃ν, ν˜ ∈ (X) (x0, ν)T  (x0, η)T  (x0, ν˜)T
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The Axiom requires that for each x0 ∈ X only one of the two situations is possible:
(1) agent 0 is indifferent between any possessions of others, given x0 or (2) there are
possessions of others that make agent 0 both happier and unhappier in both S1 and S2
than his consumption level. Essentially, this rules out two unlikely cases when agent
0 just likes others to be around or hates others to be around (again, in comparison to
his consumption level, that is represented by the indifference pair). The Axiom is not
particularly demanding, but, amazingly, it allows for much nicer utility function.14
The following Definitions and Theorem give the representation:
Definition 1 Call any v : X2 → R a status function if it is not constant and there is
an x∗(x0) ∈ X such that v(x0, x∗(x0)) = 0 for all x0 ∈ X .
Status functions will play the role of the social part of the preferences representa-
tion. The condition that for all x0, there is x∗(x0) such that v(x0, x∗(x0)) = 0 might
look restrictive. However, it is just the reflection of Axiom E4.1 that asks for the
existence of x∗ for each x0 such that (x0, x∗)S1 ∼ (x0, x∗)S2 . In what follows, status
function v(x0, x∗) will be zero if (x0, x∗)S1 ∼ (x0, x∗)S2 (thus only personal part of
preferences matters).
Definition 2 Let g : X → R be any function, v : X2 → R be status function such that
for all x0 ∈ X either v(x0, ·) ≡ 0 or there are x, x ′ ∈ X with v(x0, x)/v(x0, x ′) < 0,
and let π : X → R satisfy π(x0) ∈ (0, 1) for all x0. For T ∈ S let VT : ET → R be
defined as
VS1 [h] = Eh[g(x0) + v(x0, x)] (4.1)
VS2 [h] = Eh[g(x0) + π(x0)v(x0, x)]
Finally, let V : E → R be equal to VT [h] for all T ∈ S and h ∈ ET .15
Theorem 1 The following two statements are equivalent:
1.  satisfies E1–E6
2.  has a utility representation V : E → R as described in Definition 2, unique up
to a positive affine transformation.
Proof See Sect. 7. unionsq
In the utility representation g(x0)+ v(x0, x), the first term is the consumption part
of the utility and the second term represents the social utility. Notice that, as desired,
g(x0) is common in both utilities. The functions v(x0, x) and π(x0)v(x0, x) satisfy
two properties: (1) they are equal to zero only when agent 0 does not care about the
two groups; (2) whenever they are not zero (there are some group effects) they are
different. This reflects the ideas about the separation of consumption described above.
In particular, it is never the case that v(x0, x) and π(x0)v(x0, x) are equal and not
zero. This case is not desirable because it is not clear then whether it is consumption
14 In particular, E6 does not put any restrictions on the size of X (see Appendix 8).
15 Notation Eh [g(x0) + v(x0, x)] means the expectation of g + v w.r.t. h ∈ (X2). x0 and x show where
the first and the second components of support of h go.
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or social utility that drives agent 0’s preference. Also, in this representation, there is
essentially only one social utility function v(x0, x). For the group S2, there is also a
weighting function π : X → R that tells how much less does agent 0 care about S2
than S1 for each x0.
This representation is compatible with utilities that have reference points. For exam-
ple, preferences given by utilities VS1(x0, η) = g(x0) + (x0 − Eη) and VS2(x0, η) =
g(x0)+β(x0 − Eη) with β ∈ (0, 1) satisfy all the Axioms E1–E6. Here, consumption
part of the preferences is g(x0) and social part is given by the difference between x0
and the mean of the distribution of the possessions of others Eη.
Now we can move on to the representation result without E6.
Definition 3 Let g : X → R be any function, and vS1 , vS2 : X2 → R be status func-
tions such that for any x0, x ∈ X and any η ∈ (X)
vS1(x0, x) = vS2(x0, x) ⇐⇒ vS1(x0, x) = 0 (4.2)




















⇐ Eη[vS2(x0, ·)] = 0 (4.4)
For T ∈ S, let VT : ET → R be defined as
VT [h] = Eh[g(x0) + vT (x0, x)].
Finally, let V : E → R be equal to VT [h] for all T ∈ S and h ∈ ET .16
Theorem 2 The following two statements are equivalent:
1.  satisfies E1–E5
2.  has a utility representation V : E → R as described in Definition 3, unique up
to a positive affine transformation.
Proof See Sect. 7. unionsq
As can be easily noticed, Theorem 2 allows for more variation in utilities than
Theorem 1. In particular, for fixed x0, the utilities in two groups don’t have to be
multiples of one another. However, the drawback is the conditions (4.3) and (4.4). It
is not exactly obvious which functions satisfy them and which do not.
Certainty analogs of Axioms E5 and E6 can be used to show the same result in
case when preferences are defined only over possessions in X2. This, however, is only
possible if there is some additional structure on X and  that would allow for unique
utility function (up to a positive affine transformation). It seems more attractive to
assume that preferences are defined over distributions than to add ad hoc structure
to X .
16 Notation Eη[vS1 (x0, ·)] means the expectation of vS1 (x0, ·) w.r.t. η ∈ (X).
123
520 A. Vostroknutov
4.2 The role of inter-group Axioms
I would like to discuss the relevance of inter-group Axioms E4 and E5 to the result of
Theorems 1 and 2. Both Axioms are necessary to uniquely disentangle personal and
social part of the utility. However, E5 also has some desirable normative properties.
Let us start with E4. Suppose E4 does not hold, then it is true that there exists x0 ∈ X
such that for all x∗ ∈ X either (x0, x∗)S1  (x0, x∗)S2 or (x0, x∗)S2  (x0, x∗)S1 .
Notice that this strict preference has to come from some difference between the groups
as personal possessions x0 and possessions of others x∗ are the same on the left and
on the right. Therefore, for x0 and any possessions of others x∗ agent 0 is always not
indifferent between the two groups. But then, we cannot obtain a unique separability
of utility like in Theorem 2 simply because there is no reference point to determine
personal utility g(x0) anymore. We can choose g(x0) in any way we want and think
of the rest of the utility as social part (the same idea was used in Sect. 2). Axiom E4
is used in the proof of Theorem 2 exactly to uniquely uncover the function g(x0).
This is done in the following way. Suppose E4 holds, then for all x0 there is x∗ with
(x0, x∗)S1 ∼ (x0, x∗)S2 . The indifference in this case means that agent 0 is indifferent
between the two groups given some possessions of others x∗. In other words, whatever
group effects there are they are nullified by the special properties of x∗ (for example,
agent 0 might not care about which group of others to belong to as long as x0 = x∗).
Now, let us look at the set
X∗ = {(x0, x∗) ∈ X2 : (x0, x∗)S1 ∼ (x0, x∗)S2}.
This is the collection of all pairs of possessions that satisfy E4. The set X∗ has one
important property: for any pair in X∗, agent 0 is indifferent between the groups.
Therefore, we can treat the restriction of  to X∗ as a genuine personal utility of agent
0. The fact that by E4 X∗ contains pairs for any x0 allows us to completely determine
personal utility g(x0). This would be impossible if some x0 were missing, or if E4 did
not hold.
Now let us turn to E5. Intuitively, E5 says that agent 0 cares about group S1 more
than about group S2. This is expressed relatively to the pairs of possessions for which
agent 0 is indifferent between the groups (elements of X∗). E5 says that given fixed x0
if in group S2 agent 0 prefers (x0, y∗) to (x0, x∗) then he should like (x0, y∗) in group
S1 even more. This condition is normative. However, it sounds appealing because it
seems unrealistic to think that agent 0 can switch his overall group preference depend-
ing on x0. The example can be again “all economists” and “all biologists.” Economist
would care more about academic success (misfortune) among economists than among
biologists.
Despite its normative nature Axiom, E5 is also necessary for the unique separation
result of Theorem 2. In particular, it rules out the following undesirable case:
(x0, x∗)S1 ∼ (x0, x∗)S2
uprise uprise
(x0, y∗)S1 ∼ (x0, y∗)S2
Here x0 is fixed, but there are two different possessions of others x∗ and y∗ for which
agent 0 is indifferent between the two groups. Also, in both groups agent 0 prefers
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(x0, y∗) to (x0, x∗). This situation is undesirable since it is not clear whether x∗ or
y∗ should be used in the construction of the personal utility as described above. E5
ensures that for any x∗ and y∗ if (x0, x∗)S1 ∼ (x0, x∗)S2 and (x0, y∗)S1 ∼ (x0, y∗)S2
then the only situation possible is complete indifference in the diagram above:
(x0, x∗)S1 ∼ (x0, x∗)S2
 
(x0, y∗)S1 ∼ (x0, y∗)S2
Thus, the determination of personal utility is unambiguous.
In Appendix 8, it is shown that it is possible to replace E5 with the indifference
requirement above (Axiom E5•) and to prove the theorem analogous to Theorem 2
(Theorem 5). In Theorem 5, the conditions (4.3) and (4.4) of Definition 3 are not pres-
ent anymore. Thus, it is a more general result in which vS1 and vS2 are only restricted
by Definition 1. However, this generality does not allow for rather appealing utility
representations given in Theorems 1 and 3.
4.3 Linear group disparity
This section is an attempt to restrict the number of parameters in utility function even
further (comparing to Theorem 1). This is done by dropping E6 and replacing E5 with
something stronger.
E5 Linear Group Disparity. There is π ∈ (0, 1) such that for all x0 ∈ X and
η, ν ∈ (X)
(x0, η)S1 ∼ (x0, η)S2 ⇒ (π(x0, ν) + (1 − π)(x0, η))S1 ∼ (x0, ν)S2
E5 requires that there is some fixed probability π such that agent 0 is indifferent
between having any pair of possessions in S2 and having the same pair in S1 with
probability π . In terms of the weighting of the social part of the utility, this means
that the weight is always the same. Whether this assumption is reasonable or not
can be determined experimentally. The following Definition and Theorem give the
representation for this case.
Definition 4 Let g : X → R be any function, v : X2 → R be status function, and let
π ∈ (0, 1). For T ∈ S let VT : ET → R be defined as
VS1 [h] = Eh[g(x0) + v(x0, x)] (4.5)
VS2 [h] = Eh[g(x0) + πv(x0, x)]
Finally, let V : E → R be equal to VT [h] for all T ∈ S and h ∈ ET .
Theorem 3 The following two statements are equivalent:
1.  satisfies E1–E4, E5 
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2.  has a utility representation V : E → R as described in Definition 4, unique up
to a positive affine transformation.
Proof See Sect. 7. unionsq
5 The model with multiple distributions
In the previous section, it was assumed that the agent cares about two groups as sep-
arate entities. In particular, he does not care how many people are in each group and
what are their personal characteristics. However, there are cases in which group size
and individualities of others can matter (see discussion in Sect. 6.1). Therefore, in this
section, the model is extended to incorporate these possibilities.
Assume that agent 0 considers separate distribution of possessions for each indi-
vidual in each group of others. The important difference from the previous section
comes from the possibility for other agents to belong to several subgroups simulta-
neously. I use Anscombe and Aumann (1963) framework to construct preferences that
are represented by unique17 expected utility function that is given by
U (x0, x1, . . . , xT ) = f (x0) +
∑
i∈T
πi u(x0, xi )
when restricted to the degenerate distributions over (xi )i∈T . Here x0 is a measure of
possessions of agent 0, whose preferences are studied. (xi )i∈T are the same measures
for other agents in subgroup T of some set S of all possible others. Agent 0 cares about
two things. First, x0 has some consumption value. Second, agent 0 derives social value
from x0 by comparing it to what others have. The consumption part of the utility is
represented by f (x0), whereas the status part is the weighted sum over others. The
function u(x0, x) describes the specific way agent 0 cares about his position rela-
tive to one other person and (πi )i∈T are the weights that represent the importance or
“closeness” of each other individual to agent 0.
Notice that the desired utility form U in this case, when restricted to the single
distribution case (all others have the same distribution over possessions), corresponds
to the result of Theorem 3, which was obtained with very strong Axiom E5. Below I
show that it is possible to obtain representation U without anything like E5.
In order to obtain uniqueness of this representation, it is necessary that the prefer-
ences of agent 0 are observed in different subgroups of others. Moreover, in order to
obtain unique weights (πi )i∈S for each agent in S and unique function u, it is neces-
sary that the observed subgroups have certain degree of intersection. In case of disjoint
subgroups, it is impossible to pin down unique function u.
The following definition puts the constraints on the observable subgroups.
Definition 5 Say that the collection of observed subgroups C ⊆ 2S is connected if
{∅} /∈ C, |C| > 1, ∪C = S, and for all T, R ∈ C there exist C1, . . . , CK ∈ C such
that
17 Up to a positive affine transformation.
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T ∩ C1 = ∅, Ck ∩ Ck+1 = ∅, CK ∩ R = ∅ where k = 1 . . . K − 1.
The first three requirements say that (1) we do not observe the behavior of agent 0
in complete solitude (the presence of observer himself makes it impossible); (2) there
is more than one subgroup (for otherwise we cannot uniquely separate status and con-
sumption); (3) subgroups cover all other agents (if not, then remove unobserved agents
from S) and (4) any two subgroups can be “connected” by the sequence of intersecting
subgroups (otherwise we would have “disconnected” collections of subgroups again
making unique identification impossible, see Sect. 2).
Next, let us define for each subgroup T ⊆ S the set of outcomes about which agent
0 cares, or has preferences. It is natural to consider
XT := (X {0}∪T )
the set of all simple lotteries over the statuses of agent 0 and all other agents in sub-
group T .





be the set of all lotteries in XT in all available subsets of other agents. Consider
preference relation · over A with ∼· and · being its symmetric and asymmetric
parts.
For T ∈ C, x0 ∈ X , and h ∈ (X T ), write (x0, h R, h−R)T to emphasize the lot-
teries corresponding to agents in R ⊆ T . For x0, x ∈ X , write (x0, x)T for the lottery
that assigns possessions x0 to agent 0 and possessions x to each other agent in T .
Define a mixture of two lotteries h, z ∈ XT with the same domain T to be standard
lottery mixture. This turns XT into a mixture set as defined in Herstein and Milnor
(1953).18
The following notation is used in the description of the Axioms below. For h ∈ XT
or p ∈ (X T ), μi (h) (or μi (p)) stands for the i th marginal distribution. 
μi (p) ∈
(X T ) is the distribution obtained from p ∈ (X T ) by taking all marginals and
treating them as independent.
Suppose that the following Axioms hold:
A0 Self-Comparison. For all T ∈ C, all x0 ∈ X and all p ∈ (X T )
(x0, p)T ∼· (x0,
μi (p))T
A1 · is reflexive, transitive, total, and non-trivial: for any T ∈ C, there are
x0, x, x ′ ∈ X such that
(x0, x)T · (x0, x ′)T
18 Notice that to obtain the results in this section, it is only necessary for each separate XT to be a mixture
set. The set A does not have to possess this property.
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A2 Independence. For all T ∈ C, all h, z, w ∈ XT and all α ∈ (0, 1)
h · z ⇒ αh + (1 − α)w · αz + (1 − α)w
A3 Continuity. For all T ∈ C, all h, z, w ∈ XT there exist α, β ∈ (0, 1)
h · z · w ⇒ αh + (1 − α)w · z · βh + (1 − β)w
A4 Anonymity. For all T ∈ C, x ∈ X T , i, j ∈ T , and , m ∈ (X2)
(, x−i )T · (m, x−i )T ⇐⇒ (, x− j )T · (m, x− j )T
A5 Unimportance. For all x0 ∈ X there exists x∗(x0) ∈ X such that for all intersect-
ing T, R ∈ C, all Q ⊆ T ∩ R and all x ∈ X
(x0, (x
∗(x0))T \Q, (x)Q) ∼· (x0, (x∗(x0))R\Q, (x)Q)
A6 Group Disparity. There exist S1, S2 ∈ C such that for all x0, x, x ′ ∈ X with
(x0, x)S1 ∼· (x0, x)S2
(x0, x
′)S1 · (x0, x)S1 ⇒ (x0, x ′)S1 · (x0, x ′)S2 and
(x0, x)S1 · (x0, x ′)S1 ⇒ (x0, x ′)S2 · (x0, x ′)S1
Axioms A1–A3 are standard necessary conditions for existence of an expected
utility representation for each T ∈ C.
Axiom A4 says that agent 0 does not care about the names of the other agents. Given
any fixed outcomes for all agents but i , if agent 0 prefers lottery  to m then he will also
prefer  to m in a situation when he faces agent j instead of i with all other outcomes
still being fixed. Together with the Axioms above, A4 implies that in each restriction
· T agent 0 treats all other agents in T in the same way. The only difference comes
from the weights he attaches to different agents. These weights describe the relative
“social” closeness of others to agent 0, whereas being in subgroup T incorporates the
idea of “topological” closeness.
A4 puts restrictions on what can happen inside each subgroup T . The rest of the
Axioms deal with what happens between different subgroups. Without A5–A6 any
two restrictions · T and · R are completely unrelated. It is desirable, however, that
agent 0 choose somewhat consistently in different subgroups.
For each level of status x0 of agent 0, Axiom A5 asks for the existence of spe-
cial status level x∗(x0) of any agent i , such that agent 0, when facing the outcome
(x0, x∗(x0), h−i ), does not care about i and chooses as if i does not exist. For example,
agent 0 might not care about others as long as they have no status or possessions at all
(x∗(x0) = 0), but he starts taking them into account once they have more than that.
Axiom A6 requires that there exist two subgroups T, R ∈ C to which agent 0
attaches different total social weight. In particular, if for some (x0, x) it so happens
that (x0, x)T ∼· (x0, x)R , then if agent 0 prefers having (x0, x ′)T to (x0, x)T then he
prefers it also over (x0, x ′)R . This means that subgroup T is preferable to subgroup
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R only because agent 0 likes having agents T around more than agents R. A coun-
terexample might be the situation when all subgroups in C have the same number of
others and the same social weights are attached to all of them. In this case, we will
have hT ∼· h R for all h ∈ XT and any T, R ∈ C, which leads to the indeterminacy of
status component of the preferences. Axiom A6 is necessary when there are no two
subgroups in C such that one is the strict subset of the other. If such subgroups exist,
then A6 can be dropped without consequences.
Definition 6 Let f : X → R be any function, u : X2 → R be status function, and let
(πi )i∈S be positive numbers. For T ∈ C, let UT : XT → R be defined as
UT [h] = Eh[ f (x0) +
∑
i∈T
πi u(x0, xi )]
Finally, let U : A → R be equal to UT [h] for all T ∈ C and h ∈ XT .
Theorem 4 The following two statements are equivalent:
1. · satisfies A0–A6
2. · has a utility representation U : A → R as described in Definition 6, unique
up to a positive affine transformation.
Proof See Sect. 7. unionsq
6 Discussion
6.1 Group size matters
In this subsection, I discuss why it is intuitive to assume that people have preferences
over the group they belong to. In many theoretical and empirical papers which include
social preferences (Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Luttmer 2005), it is assumed that
agents care about their own possessions and the mean of the distribution of the pos-
sessions of others. This assumption implies that the size or the identity of the group
to which the agent compares herself become irrelevant. There are at least two good
reasons why the agent might care about the size or the identity of the reference group.
The first reason is that larger groups of people will most likely have more diverse
distribution of skills. Thus, being average among some big group of others should
not be indifferent to being average among the group’s subset. Suppose that the game
theorist from the previous example has average number of publications among people
on her department (which is, say, ranked 100). It seems very plausible that when
she is asked a question “Do you prefer to have average number of top publications
among people on your department or average number of top publications among all
economists?” she would opt for the latter. The same idea can be applied to any environ-
ment in which agents are competing with each other. For example, in soccer players
care about in which league their team is playing. They would definitely prefer to
be in average team of the first league rather than second. In general, the same effect
should be observed in environments where people care about their reputation: it would
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be desirable for people with good (bad) reputation to have more (less) others know
about it.
The second reason is that if the agent cares only about the mean of others’ posses-
sions it is impossible to separate consumption from status for the reasons described
in the beginning of this section. Given fixed possession of the agent and the distribu-
tion of possessions of others, the agent is indifferent which group to belong to. This
removes the leverage that allows to uniquely separate consumption and status.
7 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1 Theorem 2 shows that  can be represented by expected utility
functions VT (x0, x) = g(x0) + vT (x0, x) where vT (x0, x) are status functions sat-
isfying Definition 3. By E6, for any x0 ∈ X either 1) vT (x0, ·) ≡ 0 or 2) there are
x, x ′ ∈ X with vT (x0, x) > 0 > vT (x0, x ′). Consider any x0 for which the latter
holds. Let β∗ be such that β∗vS2(x0, x) + (1 − β∗)vS2(x0, x ′) = 0. Then by E5
β ∈ [0, β∗) ⇒ βvS1 (x0, x) + (1 − β)vS1 (x0, x ′) < βvS2 (x0, x) + (1 − β)vS2 (x0, x ′) < 0
β ∈ (β∗, 1] ⇒ βvS1 (x0, x) + (1 − β)vS1 (x0, x ′) > βvS2 (x0, x) + (1 − β)vS2 (x0, x ′) > 0
This implies that
lim
β↑β∗ βvS1(x0, x) + (1 − β)vS1(x0, x
′) ≤ 0
lim
β↓β∗ βvS1(x0, x) + (1 − β)vS1(x0, x
′) ≥ 0.
Since βvS1(x0, x) + (1 − β)vS1(x0, x ′) is a continuous function of β, the only way
both inequalities can hold is if β∗vS1(x0, x)+ (1−β∗)vS1(x0, x ′) = 0. This, together







=: π(x0) ∈ (0, 1)
This definition of π(x0) is unambiguous since the above equality holds for any x and
x ′ for which vT (x0, x) > 0 > vT (x0, x ′). Therefore, vS1(x0, x) = π(x0)vS2(x0, x).
In the other case, when vT (x0, ·) ≡ 0 set π(x0) to be any number between 0 and 1.
unionsq
Proof of Theorem 2 [1 ⇒ 2] By Theorem 8.4 of Fishburn (1970), Axioms E1–E3
together with mixture set structure on (X2) generated by compound lottery rule
imply that for all T ∈ S, preference relation  restricted to ET has expected utility
representation
h  z ⇐⇒ V¯T [h] ≥ V¯T [z]
for some functions V¯T , fixed up to a positive affine transformation.
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Let
X∗ := {(x0, η) ∈ (X2) : (x0, η)S1 ∼ (x0, η)S2}
and consider the set (X∗). By E4.1, (X∗) contains elements of the form (x0, x∗)
for any x0 ∈ X and by E5, for all x0 ∈ X , T ∈ S and all (x0, η), (x0, ν) ∈ (X∗),
(x0, η)T ∼ (x0, ν)T . To see that the latter statement holds, suppose, by contradic-
tion, that there are (x0, η), (x0, ν) ∈ (X∗) such that (x0, ν)S2  (x0, η)S2 . Then, E5
implies that (x0, ν)S1  (x0, ν)S2 , which contradicts the assumption that (x0, ν) ∈
(X∗).
The consequences of E4.1 and E5 imply that for any T ∈ S the restriction of V¯T to
(X∗) can be written as
V¯T [h] = Eh[gT (x0)]
for some function gT : X → R. E4.2 implies that for any  ∈ (X∗) it is true that
S1 ∼ S2 . Therefore, for any , m ∈ (X∗)
S1  mS1 ⇐⇒ S2  mS2
since all similar elements in the two copies of (X∗) are connected by the indifference
relation.
This means that the restriction of  to (X∗), viewed as a subset of either ES1 or
ES2 , induces the order, independent of the group. (X∗) is a mixture set with mix-
ture structure inherited from (X2). In addition, properties E1–E3 transfer to (X∗).
Therefore, by Theorem 8.4 of Fishburn (1970), gS1 and gS2 are positive affine transfor-
mations of one another. This makes it possible to apply positive affine transformation
to V¯S2 obtaining VS2 (which still represents  on ES2 ) so that
V¯S1 [(x0, η)S1 ] =: VS1 [(x0, η)S1 ] = VS2 [(x0, η)S2 ] =: g(x0)
whenever (x0, η)S1 ∼ (x0, η)S2 .
Let vT (x0, x) := VT (x0, x)−g(x0). We can rewrite VT (x0, x) = g(x0)+vT (x0, x).
Condition (4.2) for functions vT is satisfied since the set X∗ contains all elements
(x0, x∗) for which agent 0 is indifferent between the two groups. Conditions (4.3) and
(4.4) follow from E5. 
[2 ⇒ 1] E1–E3 follow from the only if part of Theorem 8.4 of Fishburn (1970). E4.1
is a consequence of vS1 and vS2 being status functions. E4.2 is obvious. E5 directly
follows from the properties (4.2-4.4). unionsq
Proof of Theorem 3 [1 ⇒ 2] By the same argument as in the proof of Theorem
2, we can construct the utility representation h  z ⇐⇒ V¯T [h] ≥ V¯T [z]
for some functions V¯T , fixed up to a positive affine transformation. Let (X∗)
be as in the proof of Theorem 2, then by E4.1, (X∗) contains elements of the
form (x0, x) for any x0 ∈ X and by E5, for all x0 ∈ X , T ∈ S and all
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(x0, η), (x0, ν) ∈ (X∗), (x0, η)T ∼ (x0, ν)T . To see that the latter statement holds,
consider any (x0, η), (x0, ν) ∈ (X∗). Then by E5 and the construction of (X∗)
(π(x0, η) + (1 − π)(x0, ν))S1 ∼ (x0, η)S2 ∼ (x0, η)S1 .
This implies that (x0, ν)S1 ∼ (x0, η)S1 since otherwise Independence Axiom (E2)
would be violated. (x0, ν)S2 ∼ (x0, η)S2 now follows from the transitivity of ∼.
Now, by the same argument, definitions and notation as in the proof of Theorem 2
we can rewrite VT (x0, x) = g(x0) + vT (x0, x). By E5, there exists π ∈ (0, 1) such
that for all x0, x ∈ X
π(g(x0) + vS1(x0, x)) + (1 − π)g(x0) = g(x0) + vS2(x0, x).
This implies πvS1(x0, x) = vS2(x0, x) =: πv(x0, x), which is exactly the requirement
of Definition 4. The functions v and πv are status functions by E4.1. 
[2 ⇒ 1] E1–E3 follow from the only if part of Theorem 8.4 of Fishburn (1970).
E4.1 is a consequence of v being status functions. E4.2 is obvious. E5 directly follows
from the property (4.5). unionsq
Proof of Theorem 4 [1 ⇒ 2] The idea of the proof is to establish the existence of
the weighted-additive utilities UT for all T ∈ C, then show that a unique function f
can be constructed in a way that is consistent with each of the utility functions, and,
finally, rescale the now redefined utility functions to show that all the utilities can have
the specific form described in the Theorem.
1. Fix any T ∈ C. Then A1–A3 and the fact that XT is a mixture set imply the
existence of the expected utility UT : XT → R, unique up to a positive affine





π iT Eh[u¯T (x0, x)]
where π iT > 0.
2. Lemma 3 says that for any x0 there exists a non-empty set X∗x0 which consists of
all the points x ∈ X∗x0 such that for all T, R ∈ C (x0, x)T ∼· (x0, x)R . Moreover,
for all x, y ∈ X∗x0 and all T ∈ C we have (x0, x)T ∼· (x0, y)T .19 The pairs in X∗x0
are perfect candidates for the representation of the pure consumption value of x0:
agent 0 does not care to which subgroup he belongs when choosing among pairs




{(x0, x) ∈ X2 : x ∈ X∗x0}.
19 Lemma 3 makes sure that there are no other points outside X∗x0 that satisfy these conditions. Thus, X
∗
x0
is the biggest “unique” set with these properties.
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Notice that the choice between any two pairs (x0, x), (y0, y) ∈ X∗ depends only
on x0 and y0 and nothing else. In terms of the utilities defined on the previous
step, we have
UT [(x0, x)T ] = UT [(x0, y)T ] = UR[(x0, x)R]
for all (x0, x), (x0, y) ∈ X∗, all T, R ∈ C.
Define f : X → R to be
f (x0) := UT [(x0, x)T ]
for any x ∈ X∗x0 and any T ∈ C and rewrite UT as
UT [(x0, (xi )i∈T )] = f (x0) +
∑
i∈T
π iT uT (x0, xi ) (7.1)
where uT (x0, x) = u¯T (x0, x)− f (x0)/∑i π iT and uT (x0, x) = 0 for all (x0, x) ∈
X∗.
3. Fix i ∈ S and consider all subgroups C1, . . . , Ck ∈ C to which i belongs. Then
A5 with Q = {i} implies that for all (x0, x) ∈ X2
(x0, xi , (x
∗(x0))−i )C1 ∼· · · · ∼· (x0, xi , (x∗(x0))−i )Ck
Therefore,
f (x0) + π iC1 uC1(x0, x) = · · · = f (x0) + π iCk uCk (x0, x)
implying
π iC1 uC1(x0, x) = π iC2 uC2(x0, x) = · · · = π iCk uCk (x0, x) (7.2)
for all (x0, x) ∈ X2.
Now fix some T, R ∈ C such that there are i, j ∈ T ∩ R. Then by the above
π iT uT (x0, x) = π iRu R(x0, x) (7.3)
π
j
T uT (x0, x) = π jRu R(x0, x) (7.4)
By A1, the preferences · are non-trivial on all subgroups. So, there is (y0, y) ∈ X2
such that uT (y0, y) = 0. The connectedness of C, positiveness of (π iT ) and (7.2)
implies then that uC (y0, y) = 0 for all C ∈ C.



























LuT (x0, xi )
)
(7.6)
For intersecting T, R, we can rescale all the weights (π iT ) and uT using LT,R
in place of L in (7.6). This makes the weights for all i ∈ T ∩ R equal in both
subgroups. Also, rescaled uT becomes equal to u R . Denote this rescaled UT by
LT,R(UT ).
4. C can be represented as a graph. Let all elements of C be nodes. Two nodes C1, C2
are connected by an edge if C1 ∩ C2 = ∅. By definition of C, the resulting finite
graph G is connected.20
For each node C ∈ G, there corresponds a collection of weights (π iC ) and a status
function uC . Call 〈G, {(π iC ), uC }C∈G〉 a graph structure.
Choose any nodes (T, (π iT ), uT ) and (R, (π
i
R), u R) connected by an edge. Rescale
UT to LT,R(UT ) and contract the two nodes into one node (T ∪R, (π iT∪R), uT∪R),
where uT∪R = u R .
This turns the structure 〈G, {(π iC ), uC }C∈G〉 into the structure
〈G1, {((π iT∪R), uT∪R), ((π iC ), uC )}C∈G\{T,R}〉
where G1 is a minor of G obtained by the contraction of an edge between T and
R.
Continue contracting edges until there are none left. The sequence of graph struc-
tures thus obtained is finite and its last element 〈G N , (π iS), uS〉 has one node and
no edges. By construction, for any agent i ∈ S the weight π iS is the same in all
subgroups i belongs to. The status function uS is also same in all subgroups. Let
πi = π iS and u = uS , then we obtain desired utility U : A → R defined on
XT as
UT [h] = Eh[ f (x0) +
∑
i∈T
πi u(x0, xi )]
Each UT is unique up to a positive affine transformation. In addition, all functions
UT are restricted by A5 (AF5) to have the same weights and status functions.
Thus, the whole U is unique up to a positive affine transformation. 
[2 ⇒ 1] A1 holds since u is a status function, which is assumed to be not constant.
For any T ∈ C, A2–A3 hold by the “only if” part of the Theorem 8.4 of Fishburn
(1970). Additivity of UT immediately implies A0 and A4. The assumption that u is a
20 See the definitions of all graph theoretic terms in Diestel (2000).
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status function implies that for each x0 there is x∗(x0) such that u(x0, x∗(x0)) = 0,








where S1 and S2 are as in the description of this Theorem. Suppose for some (x0, x) ∈
X2 we have U [(x0, x)S1 ] = U [(x0, x)S2 ]. Then
∑
i∈S1




can happen only when u(x0, x) = 0. Now, take any x ′ such that U [(x0, x ′)S1] >









and therefore U [(x0, x ′)S1 ] > U [(x0, x ′)S2 ]. This is the first part of A6. Second part
is proved by the exactly same argument. unionsq
8 Lemmata
Lemma 1 Suppose that · satisfies A0–A4. Then for any T ∈ C, preference relation




π iT Eh[u¯T (x0, xi )]
where π iT > 0 for all i ∈ T . Moreover, UT is unique up to a positive affine transfor-
mation.
Proof Fix any T ⊆ C and consider the restriction of · to XT . A1–A3 hold for · on
XT . Standard compound lotteries rule turns XT into a mixture set. Thus, by Theorem
8.4 of Fishburn (1970), · on XT has expected utility representation
UT [h] = Eh[u¯T (x0, (xi )i∈T )].
unique up to a positive affine transformation.21
Now fix any x0 ∈ X and consider the set
Xx0 :=
{
(x0, p) : p ∈ (X T )
}
.
21 I abuse notation by having two functions u¯T (x0, xi ) and u¯T (x0, (xi )i∈T ) with the same name but
different arguments. It is always clear from the exposition which function is considered.
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Let ∼∗ be the equivalence relation on Xx0 defined by
(x0, p) ∼∗ (x0, q) ⇔ 




be the set of equivalence classes of ∼∗. Mx0 can be described as
Mx0 =
{
(ηi )i∈T : ηi ∈ (X)
} = T (X)
where element (ηi )i∈T corresponds to (x0,
ηi ) ∈ Xx0 . Let us also use notation

μi (p) ∈ Mx0 to emphasize that 
μi (p) = (μi (p))i∈T is the equivalence class of
(x0, p) ∈ Xx0 .
Notice that by A0 h ∼∗ z ⇒ h ∼· z. Thus, we can view Mx0 as (almost) a set of
equivalence classes of ∼· with some elements still being indifferent under ∼· .22 It is
therefore natural to extend · to Mx0 by setting
(ηi )i∈T · (νi )i∈T ⇔ (x0,
ηi ) · (x0,
νi )
The set Mx0 also naturally inherits the mixture set structure from Xx0 (which
inherits it from XT ) by associating the mixture of two indifference classes with the
indifference class of the mixture of any two elements inside those indifference clas-
ses.23 This mixture set structure will play the pivotal role in the proof, thus it is
necessary to show first that this procedure indeed generates mixture set structure on
Mx0 .
Define a mixture on Mx0 by
α
μi (p) + (1 − α)
μi (q) = 
μi (αp + (1 − α)q).
The first task is to show that this definition is independent of the choice of p and q:
any p′ with 
μi (p′) = 
μi (p) and q ′ with 
μi (q ′) = 
μi (q), used in the above
definition, should generate the same mixture. Indeed, it is a straightforward property
of marginal distributions that
μi (αp + (1 − α)q) = αμi (p) + (1 − α)μi (q).
Therefore,
α
μi (p) + (1 − α)
μi (q) = 
(αμi (p) + (1 − α)μi (q)).
22 Xx0/ ∼· is a partition of Xx0 . Mx0 is weakly finer partition.
23 Mixture set structure on some set Z is a mapping Z2 × [0, 1] "→ Z which defines a “mixture” of two
elements with coefficient α ∈ [0, 1] in Z . The mapping satisfies simple Axioms like associativity and
compound lottery rule (Herstein and Milnor 1953).
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This formula depends only on individual marginals μi (p) and μi (q) and thus is the
same for any choice of p′ and q ′.
The second task is to verify that the mixtures thus defined satisfy the definition
of mixture set structure. It is trivial to see that all the assumptions are satisfied
(see Definition 8.3 of Fishburn (1970)) since mixture is defined as a function of
a mixture of simple lotteries (p, q ∈ (X T )) which does possess the mixture set
structure.
The resulting formula for the mixture has one important property. When Mx0 is
viewed as a product space T (X) the definition is essentially a component-wise mix-
ture:
α(ηi )i∈T + (1 − α)(νi )i∈T = (αηi + (1 − α)νi )i∈T ,
which gives us all the ingredients to use additive utility representation result
like Theorem 13.1 of Fishburn (1970). At first, Mx0 is a component-wise mix-
ture set. At second, · on Mx0 inherits the properties A1–A3 of · on Xx0 ,
thus satisfying all the requirements of Theorem 13.1 of Fishburn (1970).24 This
is easy to see since preferences and mixing on Mx0 were defined through their
counterparts on Xx0 . Therefore, any properties of preferences are transferred. All
this implies that · on Mx0 can be represented by an additive expected utility∑
i∈T uiT (x0, xi ):
(ηi )i∈T · (νi )i∈T ⇔
∑
i∈T
Eηi [uiT (x0, x)] ≥
∑
i∈T
Eνi [uiT (x0, x)],
unique up to a positive affine transformation.25
Since · on Mx0 and · on Xx0 are essentially the same orders, we can define the
utility of · on Xx0 by
(x0, p) · (x0, q) ⇔
∑
i∈T
Eμi (p)[uiT (x0, x)] ≥
∑
i∈T
Eμi (q)[uiT (x0, x)].
This means that if A0–A3 hold, then it is possible to represent preferences
restricted to Xx0 for any x0 by an additive expected utility function. Xx0 is a
mixture set and thus by the only if part of Theorem 8.4 of Fishburn (1970) any
utility that represents · on Xx0 is a positive affine transformation of any other
utility. This implies, in particular, that representation u¯T (x0, (xi )i∈T ) for · on
XT obtained in the beginning of this proof should be positive affine transforma-
tion of some additive utility function for any x0, since u¯T (x0, (xi )i∈T ) restricted
to any Xx0 still represent · on it. Therefore, for all x0, it is possible to write
24 To verify that · is a weak order see Proposition 2.4 of Kreps (1988).
25 The expectation in this expression is taken with respect to the second argument of the functions uiT (x0, x).
The first argument is fixed.
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u¯T (x0, (xi )i∈T ) = ax0
∑
i∈T













u¯iT (x0, xi )
where ax0 > 0 and bx0 is some number.
To finish the proof of this Lemma it is left to show that all functions u¯iT are multiples
of one another. We use A4 to achieve that. Indeed, by A4, for all i, j ∈ T and any
, m ∈ (X2) it is true that
E[u¯iT (x0, x)] ≥ Em[u¯iT (x0, x)] ⇔ E[u¯ jT (x0, x)] ≥ Em[u¯ jT (x0, x)],
which can happen only if u¯iT and u¯
j
T are positive affine transformations of one another.
This implies that for all i ∈ T we can write
u¯iT (x0, x) = ai u¯1T (x0, x) + bi
where {1} ∈ T , ai > 0 and bi is some number. Let u¯T (x0, x) = u¯1T (x0, x) +∑
i bi/
∑
i ai and denote π iT = ai . Then
u¯iT (x0, x) =
∑
i∈T
π iT u¯T (x0, xi )
and UT [h] = ∑i∈T π iT Eh[u¯T (x0, xi )] represents · as desired. unionsq
Lemma 2 Suppose A5–A6 hold. Then for all C1, C2 ∈ C, all x0 ∈ X and all
x∗(x0) ∈ X satisfying A5
(x0, x
∗(x0))C1 ∼· (x0, x∗(x0))C2
Proof Let us first assume that C1 ∩ C2 = ∅. Then, by putting x = x∗(x0) in the
definition of A5, we get the desired
(x0, x
∗(x0))C1 ∼· (x0, x∗(x0))C2
Now, C is the connected collection of subsets (see Definition 5). Therefore, any two
disjoint subgroups can be connected by the sequence of intersecting ones. Therefore,
by transitivity of ∼· the result above holds for all C1, C2 ∈ C. unionsq
Lemma 3 Suppose A5–A6 hold. Then for all x0 ∈ X, there exists a non-empty set
X∗x0 = {x ∈ X : ∀T, R ∈ C (x0, x)T ∼· (x0, x)R}.
Moreover, for all x0 ∈ X, x, y ∈ X∗x0 and all T ∈ C
(x0, x)T ∼· (x0, y)T
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Proof A5 says that for all x0 ∈ X there is x∗(x0), which by Lemma 2 satisfies the
condition for being a member of X∗x0 . Therefore, we have shown that non-empty X
∗
x0
exists for all x0.
Now suppose that the second condition of the Lemma does not hold. In other words,
there is x0 and x, y ∈ X∗x0 such that for some T ∈ C
(x0, x)T · (x0, y)T
Let S1, S2 ∈ C be the two subgroups satisfying A6. Then, by definition of y
(x0, y)S1 ∼· (x0, y)S2
Moreover, the definitions of x and y and the assumption give
(x0, x)S1 ∼· (x0, x)T · (x0, y)T ∼· (x0, y)S1
The two conditions above and A6 imply that
(x0, x)S1 · (x0, x)S2
which contradicts the fact that x is an element of X∗x0 . unionsq
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Appendix
Theorem 2 with modified E5
E5• For all x0 ∈ X and η, ν ∈ (X)
[(x0, η)S1 ∼ (x0, η)S2 ∧ (x0, ν)S1 ∼ (x0, ν)S2 ] ⇒ (x0, η)S1 ∼ (x0, ν)S1 .
Definition 7 Let g : X → R be any function, and vS1 , vS2 : X2 → R be status func-
tions such that for any x0, x ∈ X
vS1(x0, x) = vS2(x0, x) ⇐⇒ vS1(x0, x) = 0 (A.1)
For T ∈ S, let VT : ET → R be defined as
VT [h] = Eh[g(x0) + vT (x0, x)].
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Finally, let V : E → R be equal to VT [h] for all T ∈ S and h ∈ ET .
Theorem 5 The following two statements are equivalent:
1.  satisfies E1–E4, E5 •
2.  has a utility representation V : E → R as described in Definition 7, unique up
to a positive affine transformation.
Proof [1 ⇒ 2] By the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 2, we can con-
struct the utility representation h  z ⇐⇒ V¯T [h] ≥ V¯T [z] for some functions V¯T ,
fixed up to a positive affine transformation. Let (X∗) be as in the proof of Theorem
2, then by E4.1, (X∗) contains elements of the form (x0, x∗) for any x0 ∈ X and by
E5•, for all x0 ∈ X , T ∈ S and all (x0, η), (x0, ν) ∈ (X∗), (x0, η)T ∼ (x0, ν)T .
Now, by the same argument, definitions and notation as in the proof of Theorem 2
we can rewrite VT (x0, x) = g(x0) + vT (x0, x). Condition (A.1) for functions vT is
satisfied since the set X∗ contains all elements (x0, x∗) for which agent 0 is indifferent
between the two groups. 
[2 ⇒ 1] E1–E3 follow from the only if part of Theorem 8.4 of Fishburn (1970). E4.1
is a consequence of vS1 and vS2 being status functions. E4.2 is obvious. E5 directly
follows from the property (A.1). unionsq
E6 and finiteness/compactness of X
It might look like that the requirements of E6 are not compatible with the set X being
finite or compact. Here is an example with X = {1, 2, 3}. Suppose, (x, x)S1 ∼ (x, x)S2
for all x ∈ X . Let S1 be defined, for example, by
(1, 3) ∼ (1, 2) ∼ (1, 1)

(2, 3)  (2, 2)  (2, 1)

(3, 3) ∼ (3, 2) ∼ (3, 1)
For each x ∈ X this satisfies E6.
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